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On the Horizon
Editor: O. Sami Saydjari, ssaydjari@cyberdefenseagency.com

International Working
Group on Assurance
Cases (for Security)

C

ritical systems are aptly named—from electric
power to water and gas to the telephone system
and the Internet, they’re all critical to some aspect
of our daily lives. We’re a networked society and,

as such, it’s important to both know whether critical systems are
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trustworthy and be able to communicate, review, and debate the level
of trust achieved in them. In the
safety domain, explicit safety cases
are increasingly required by law,
regulations, and standards. (We define a safety case as “a documented
body of evidence that provides a
convincing and valid argument that
a system is adequately safe for a
given application in a given environment.”1) Increasingly, regulatory agencies are making the case
for a goal-based approach, in which
claims (or goals) are made about the
system, and arguments and evidence support those claims. This
approach1–3 goes back at least a
decade, and was heavily influenced
by Stephen Toulmin’s early work
and by the contemporary perspective of proof as a social process.4,5
The need to understand risks
isn’t just a safety issue: organizations
must know their risks and be able to
communicate and address them for
multiple stakeholders, from the
boardroom to the back office and
beyond. To address these additional
sources of risk, researchers are generalizing the ideas behind the safety
case into the assurance case. An international community has begun to
PUBLISHED BY THE IEEE COMPUTER SOCIETY
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form around this issue and the challenge of moving from rhetoric to reality. In this article, we outline what a
small, international group of experts, spanning various disciplines in
safety, security, reliability, and critical
infrastructure, has been doing with
the International Working Group
on Assurance Cases (for Security),
what we hope to achieve, and where
we go next.

The first step
One of the first public events this international community organized
was a workshop entitled, “Assurance Cases: Best Practices, Possible
Obstacles, and Future Opportunities,” which was part of the International Conference on Dependable
Systems and Networks held in Florence, Italy, June 2004. Chuck
Howell (MITRE), Shari Lawrence
Pfleeger (RAND Corp.), Victoria
Stavridou-Coleman (SRI International), and Sofia Guerra (Adelard)
organized the workshop to promote
communication among groups that
were working in the broad area of
assurance cases. These groups were
often unaware of what other, similar
groups were doing, so discussions
focused on the challenges and op1540-7993/06/$20.00 © 2006 IEEE
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portunities for assurance cases, with
the additional aim of initiating the
development of a standard set of best
practices and guidelines for developing and assessing assurance cases.
Speakers came from Adelard, the
City University of London, MITRE,
Pfleeger Consulting Group, Praxis
Critical Systems, RAND Corp., SKI
(the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate), SRI International, Carnegie
Mellon’s Software Engineering Institute (SEI), and the University of
York. The full set of position papers
and presentations is available at
www.aitcnet.org/AssuranceCases/
agenda.html.
An important result of the
workshop was the decision to take
this work further in the security
area; accordingly, Robin Bloomfield (City University London and
Adelard), O. Sami Saydjari (Cyber
Defense Agency), and Chuck Weinstock (SEI) organized a workshop
on assurance cases for security in
June 2005, which SEI hosted in
Washington, DC. Many of the
same individuals who participated
in the first workshop attended this
follow-up workshop.

Assurance cases
for security
The follow-up workshop, called the
“Workshop on Assurance Cases for
Security,” brought together people
working on assuring safety, reliability, and security to envision how assurance cases for security ought to
work and how the community
might pursue viable technical approaches to realize that vision. An
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international mix of security and
safety practitioners and researchers
from Adelard; Cyber Defense Agency; MITRE; SEI; the UK’s Defense
Science and Technology Laboratory
(DSTL); CERT; the University of
Missouri, Rolla; City University
(London); York University; Carnegie Mellon; SKI; the University
of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign;
and the European Commission’s
Joint Research Center (JRC) represented the intersection of several
communities.
The workshop’s overall objective
was to assess how to develop assurance cases for security and what
challenges such activities presented.
It produced the following outputs:
• a vision statement, including what
the workshop attendees hoped to
achieve with assurance cases and
what difference it would make if
we were wildly (or even moderately) successful;
• a top-level decomposition of the
problems associated with developing assurance cases;
• a mapping of existing work to the
decomposition;
• a set of key hard problems and
promising approaches;
• a list of possible research sponsors
for assurance cases; and
• some worked examples.
The workshop started with introductory talks and discussions on
safety cases and security assurance,
followed by parallel sessions in
which three groups constructed
example fragments of assurance
cases for security (the previously
mentioned safety cases) based on a
common model. Ann Miller (University of Missouri, Rolla) offered a
three-layer model of a robot
manufacturing facility, with a supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) layer and a
corporate intranet. The groups
used this model to explore the differences between security and
safety cases, and to learn what

works and what doesn’t in a security context.
The workshop’s overall aim was
to investigate possible answers to
some key issues:
• Claims. Are there standard patterns for claims about certain
kinds of properties or systems? Are
these claims sufficiently tangible
to be subjected to rigorous assurance cases? How can organizations elicit appropriate claims
from stakeholders?
• Arguments. What makes an assurance case “compelling”? Are there
standard patterns for arguments?
Do different audiences have differing criteria, and are some criteria
better than others? What arguments should be compelling, and
what arguments do people actually find compelling? How do
additional arguments or evidence
increase a case’s compelling nature? If accepted notions make a
case compelling, to what extent
do we know that these accepted
notions are correct?
• Evidence. What evidence is needed
to support an argument? What
new types of evidence are needed
to create more sound arguments?
By what metrics do we assess the
effectiveness of evidence?
• Justification. What is the cost–
benefit justification for developing
an assurance case? Are there different levels of effort, depending on
motivation? Can we quantify
these levels? What short-term
benefits arise from assurance case
activity? Can we show that a well-

cases maintained as systems evolve?
• Composition. How can assurance
cases be composed?
A recent report (www.csr.city.ac.
uk/AssuranceCases) provides the
workshop’s technical output; it concentrates on the results of the three
breakout groups, which generated
very different and somewhat complementary results. The report’s conclusion section summarizes the
discussion on the way forward.
A key lesson from the workshop
was how the participants’ different
backgrounds and perspectives
proved to be mutually stimulating
and informative. The more safetyoriented participants also recognized that, even though many
technical issues must be addressed
and safety tools and notations can
be deployed on security, the underlying methods still must be developed. The lessons learned and
issues raised include
• describing how hierarchical conceptual decomposition puts security requirements in context;
• acknowledging the need to address all attributes, terminology,
and concept issues;
• declaring “open season” on arguments and leaving it to the users to
define them;
• determining the balance between
inductive and deductive techniques;
• discovering the role of models and
the relationships between them;
• examining how the results of vulnerability assessments and attack
trees fit into assurance cases;

A key lesson from the workshop was how the
participants’ different perspectives proved to
be mutually stimulating and informative.
defined and executed assurance
case process will cost less than current assurance processes?
• Maintenance. How are assurance

• determining when to stop and
knowing when the case is complete;
• defining the role of standards; and
• learning how to deal with the

www.computer.org/security/
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need for both trusted and trustworthy cases.
The workshop concluded with the
determination to continue the series
into assurance cases for security.

Trust and risk
communication in
critical infrastructure
In March 2006, the series continued
with a workshop entitled, “Assurance
Cases for Security: Communicating
Risks in Infrastructures,” hosted by
the European Commission’s JRC in
Ispra, Italy, and organized by Marcelo
Masera. The event brought together
the core group who attended the previous workshops along with experts
in risk assessment and communication. Importantly, it included a practitioner from a critical UK nuclear
infrastructure who was responsible
for justifying information and communications technology (ICT) system security.
The important conclusion from
this workshop was the need to support the communication of risks
between stakeholders involved in
critical infrastructures; assurance
cases appear to be a workable solution. They can be applied to the
different types of objects that compose an infrastructure, from products to processes to systems to
organizations. The assurance cases
for different types of objects might
exist for different objectives, take
different shapes, and obtain evidence from very different sources,
but we believe it might be possible
to develop a common theoretical
and methodological support for all
assurance cases.
Assurance cases can be motivated by regulations (laws, standards, and codes of practice),
internal decisions made by owners
or producers, and bilateral agreements (or contracts). This multiplicity of objectives can affect the
negotiations and trade-offs in assurance case claims—and, more im68

IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY

■

MAY/JUNE 2006

portant, to the interpretation of an
assurance case’s results.
Because critical infrastructures
and process control systems are dynamic with changes in configuration caused by connectivity, software
updates, and other business issues,
their assurance cases are more
dynamic because they must be reviewed when new information
comes in about system vulnerabilities or threats, or when the system’s
structure, functioning, or behavior
change. Consequently, the assurance
case’s validity is in constant flux. This
fact creates a specific dynamic in a
system’s evolution from trustworthy
to trusted.
The workshop also further developed some of the observations
from previous workshops, especially
about the need for argument composition to incorporate rationale
and evidence from different sources.
The multiplicity of stakeholders requires us to manage different views
on an assurance case (for example,
specific claims and details in arguments and evidence). In multiparty
settings, the assurance case plays a
key role in risk-related decisionmaking processes, which might be
performed in very different styles
(such as adversarial or collaborative).

hese various workshops have
identified several technical, policy, and research challenges that policy makers, practitioners, and the
research community must solve; fortunately, we’re working collectively
and individually to address them. We
are currently developing more considered technical publications from
workshop reports and planning further activities. If you’re interested in
collaborating or participating, please
contact Robin Bloomfield (reb@
csr.city.ac.uk).

T
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